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Intertemporal choices are decisions with consequences that 
play out over time. These choices range from the prosaic – 
how much food to eat at a meal – to life-changing decisions 
about education, marriage, fertility, health behaviors and 
savings. Intertemporal preferences also affect policy 
debates about long-run challenges, such as global warming. 
Historically, it was assumed that delayed rewards were 
discounted at a constant rate over time. Recent theoretical 
and empirical advances from economic, psychological and 
neuroscience perspectives, however, have revealed a more 
complex account of how individuals make intertemporal 
decisions. We review and integrate these advances. We 
emphasize three different, occasionally competing, 
mechanisms that are implemented in the brain: 
representation, anticipation and self-control. 
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Economic, psychological and neuroscientific perspectives on 
intertemporal choice 
70 
Intertemporal choices – decisions with consequences that 
play out over time – are important and ubiquitous. 
Decisions about spending, investments, diet, relationships, 
fertility, crime and education all contain intertemporal 
tradeoffs. In this paper, we discuss interrelated 
perspectives on intertemporal choice from the fields of 
economics, psychology and neuroscience. 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
Until recently, the main contribution of economics to 
the study of intertemporal decisions was modeling. For 
nearly 80 years, economists have analyzed intertemporal 
decisions using the discounted utility (DU) model, which 
assumes that people evaluate the pleasures and pains 
resulting from a decision in much the same way that 
financial markets evaluate losses and gains, exponentially 
‘discounting’ the value of outcomes according to how 
delayed they are in time. DU has been used to describe 
how people actually make intertemporal choices and it has 
been used as a tool for public policy. Policy decisions about 
how much to spend on research and development, health 
and education all depend on the discount rate used to 
analyze the decision. Indeed, recently the discount rate 
has proven to be a key parameter in the policy debate 
about global warming [1]. 
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The main contribution of psychology has been to 
identify, through empirical research, psychological 
mechanisms underlying intertemporal choice. For 
example, George Ainslie’s research on the structure of 
time discounting posed the first serious challenge to the 
DU model – specifically to the assumption that people 
discount the future exponentially [2,3]. The concept of 
‘hyperbolic time discounting’ (explained below) can be 
considered the first observed pattern of behavior that is 
inconsistent with DU – a DU ‘anomaly’. Subsequent 
research by both psychologists and economists has 
identified a wide range of additional anomalies [4–12]. 
Economists have responded to these findings by 
constructing new models of intertemporal choice, which 
incorporate psychological insights, to explain otherwise 
anomalous patterns of economic behavior [13]. 
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Neuroscience is the most recent entrant into what was 
already a rich interdisciplinary mix of research. Although 
still in its infancy, neuroscience research on intertemporal 
choice has led to an enhanced understanding of how 
intertemporal choices might be implemented in the brain 
[14–17], and, as we document, has already begun to 
inform economic modeling and to provide new clues about 
productive empirical and theoretical avenues for future 
research. 
Time discounting 
The great strengths of the DU model are its simplicity and 
generality. DU is easy to apply mathematically to any 
kind of intertemporal choice. According to DU, 
intertemporal choices are no different from any other type 
of choices except that some consequences are delayed, and 
hence must be anticipated and discounted (i.e. reweighted 
to take account of delay). Much of the research on 
intertemporal choice has, therefore, focused on the degree 
to which people anticipate and discount future events. 
Numerous experiments in animals, notably rats and 
pigeons, have shown that under operant conditioning 
paradigms, the effectiveness of a reinforcer diminishes the 
further in time it is delayed [18]. In pigeons, for instance, 
the reinforcement value of three units of reward available 
in 11 s is approximately equal to the reinforcement value 
of eight units of reward available after 20 s [19]. The 
traditional model of intertemporal choice uses ‘exponential 
discounting’, in which a reward of magnitude x occurring 
at some time t in the future is worth δtx, where δ ≤ 1 is a 
fixed constant (the discount factor). In other words, the 
value of the reward decays by the same proportion for 
each minute that its occurrence is delayed. Figure 1 plots 
1 three different discount functions, including an 
exponential function with δ = 0.95. 
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However, the bulk of the evidence (primarily from rats 
and pigeons) suggests that animals discount the future in 
a non-exponential manner. The most commonly described 
discounting behavior is hyperbolic, which means that 
delayed rewards are discounted by functions that are 
inversely proportional to delay – for example, 1/t or 
generalizations thereof [18–21]. Hyperboloid discount 
functions decay at a more rapid rate in the short run than 
in the long run, so a hyperbolic discounter is more 
impatient when making short-run tradeoffs than when 
making long-run tradeoffs. Figure 1 also plots a 
hyperboloid [7] and a ‘quasi-hyperbolic’ discount function 
(Box 1) [13,22]. 
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Humans also have been shown to discount the future 
hyperbolically [7,20], and many commentators have 
implicitly or explicitly drawn connections between the 
patterns of choice displayed by animals and by humans. 
However, whether the parallel between animals and 
humans is a matter of analogy or homology is unclear. 
Most humans care about, or at least are capable of caring 
about, costs and benefits that extend years or even 
decades. By contrast, our nearest evolutionary relatives 
have measured discount functions that fall in value nearly 
to zero after a delay of about one minute. For example, 
Stevens et al. report that cotton-top tamarin monkeys are 
unable to wait more than eight seconds to triple the value 
of an immediately available food reward [23]. 
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Some researchers have speculated that the difference 
between humans and other animals lies in our ability to 
form a mental image of, and care about, delayed outcomes 
[24], and there is widespread agreement that the 
prefrontal cortex, which is disproportionately large in 
humans relative to other species, has an important role in 
this capability. The first clues about the function of the 
prefrontal cortex came from people who experienced 
damage to it, either through accident, stroke or frontal 
lobotomy [24–26]. Studies have traced the development of 
self-control capabilities in children to the maturation of 
prefrontal areas [27], and still other studies hav
connected criminality and violent out-of-control behavior
to childhood injury to prefrontal regions [28,29]. Human
undoubtedly share with other animals the mechanism
that produce rapid hyperbolic time discounting, but w
also have the capacity, seemingly enabled by th
prefrontal cortex, to make decisions that take account of 
much longer span of time. 
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All of these pieces of evidence, as well as the commo
observance in humans of extremes in apparent regard (o
disregard) for the future, have led to a perspective that i
both new and old. According to this perspective, tim
discounting in humans results from the interaction of tw
systems, one which is capable of anticipating and carin
about the distant future, and the other which is muc
more oriented toward the present. Empirical support fo
such a perspective comes from a recent study in whic
subjects’ brains were scanned while they made choice
between smaller money amounts that could be receive
earlier and large amounts that could be received later [14
Some of the choices were between an immediate and a 
delayed payment, and others were between delayed and 
even more delayed payments. The researchers found that 
prefrontal regions were involved in all intertemporal 
choices (relative to rest) but that the mesolimbic dopamine 
system and associated regions were involved only in 
choices with an immediate outcome. Moreover, when 
immediate payment was one of the options, the relative 
activation of the two regions (prefrontal or dopamine) was 
a significant predictor of choice. This research lends 
support to the idea that hyperbolic time discounting 
results from the splicing of two systems with different 
perspectives toward the future, and that the prefrontal 
cortex has an especially important role in implementing 
more patient preferences. However, it does not provide 
definitive evidence of causal relationships, because the 
data are purely correlational. 
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Other dimensions of intertemporal choice 
Time discounting might be the most frequently studied 
aspect of intertemporal choice, but it is only one of several 
dimensions that come into play. In this section, we discuss 
three other mechanisms that, prior research suggests, 
have an especially important role in intertemporal choice: 
‘anticipation’, ‘self-control’ and ‘representation’. 
Anticipation refers to an individual’s propensity to 
imagine, and experience pleasure and pain in anticipation 
of, a future event. Self-control refers to the tensions that 
people experience when they attempt to implement a far-
sighted decision in the presence of immediate temptation. 
Representation refers to the way that the brain interprets 
or frames a set of choices. Representation often happens 
first in a decision time-line, but we discuss representation 
last because less is known about this component of 
intertemporal decision making. Although these 
mechanisms, in some situations, come into competition 
with time discounting, in other situations they contribute 
to it. Indeed, as touched upon above, there is some 
question of whether these are the mechanisms underlying 
time discounting. 
Anticipation 
The classical economic model of intertemporal choice 
assumes that choices have no utility consequences other 
than the consumption events that result from those 
choices. For example, the pleasure of a decadent meal is 
assumed to arise from the meal itself and not the 
awareness, before the event, that it will take place. In 
practice, however, when a plan is made in advance – for 
instance a dinner reservation – there is a waiting period 
during which the future outcome is anticipated. Moreover, 
this period of anticipation might have its own affective 
consequences for the actor. The period between decision 
and outcome has received relatively little consideration 
from economic researchers because economic models 
typically do not treat purely mental events as intrinsic 
sources of utility [30]. 
From a behavioral perspective, however, both animals 
and humans experience subjective changes in mental state 
associated with this continuous period of anticipation. 
When rats are conditioned to associate a neutral stimulus 
2 with a noxious outcome (a loud noise), they enter a state of 
physiological arousal between the stimulus and outcome. 
The degree of arousal is associated with their tendency to 
‘startle’ in response to the noise. Hence, the startle 
response serves as a measure of the degree of learning 
that has occurred [
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31,32]. Humans display similar states 
of arousal, which can be indexed by the galvanic skin 
conductance response (GSR) [33]. When the anticipation 
period is extended, the arousal level can assume complex 
forms, including an initial surprise effect when the 
individual first becomes aware of the impending outcome 
and a ramp-up to the time when the outcome is expected 
to occur [34,35]. 
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The anticipation of an outcome can lead to physiological 
arousal, but does this state of anticipation enter into the 
decision-making process? Under certain circumstances it 
does. Consideration of the anticipation of a particularly 
pleasurable event, such as the promise of a kiss from a 
movie star, or the dread of something painful, such as an 
electric shock, often enters into the decisions that people 
make; for example, causing them to get unpleasant 
outcomes over with quickly to eliminate what otherwise 
would be an aversive period of waiting [36,37], behavior 
that is contrary to the most basic prediction of the DU 
model, assuming that people discount the future. A concise 
explanation of this phenomenon is that anticipation can 
confer utility (or disutility) in, and of, itself. Human 
neuroimaging data demonstrate that activity in regions 
associated with the experience of pain increases in 
anticipation of delayed painful stimuli [38–44], and the 
degree of this anticipatory activity correlates with the 
degree to which an individual chooses to expedite 
unpleasant outcomes [36]. 
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Anticipatory responses to appetitive stimuli are also 
common in neural systems, although these tend to be in 
different regions than for aversive stimuli. Anticipatory 
activity in the ventral striatum and orbitofrontal cortex 
has been associated with the prospect of receiving a 
financial windfall [45–47], beautiful faces [48] and 
pleasant-tasting drinks [49–51]. Because of the relatively 
short interval between the cue and the outcome in thes
experiments, it is difficult to ascertain whether th
activity is in response to the initial cue or the waitin
period. 
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Self-control 
It is often difficult to wait for a delayed reward when a
immediately gratifying alternative is available. Fo
instance, quitting smoking is difficult because cigarette
are available at every news-stand and drug store. 
Situations such as this can lead to ‘preference reversals’,
wherein people initially decide to take a far-sighted cours
of action – quitting smoking – but subsequently succum
to temptation [20]. Preference reversals are observabl
phenomena that point to the weaknesses of standard DU
theory, and they occur in a wide variety of circumstances
Although it is possible, as we shall see, to modify th
discount function in a way that explains preferenc
reversals, the core mechanism might be generated b
phenomena other than the discount function. 
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Successful implementation of a far-sighted plan of 
behavior, such as ending a bad habit, thus involves at 
least two distinct components. First, the individual needs 
to make an initial far-sighted decision, which is likely to 
depend on the ability to anticipate future consequences. 
Second, she needs to resist short-run temptations, which 
will undermine her ability to implement that decision. Any 
successful model of intertemporal choice should 
incorporate features that accurately describe the tug of 
war between long-run (‘virtuous’) intentions and short-run 
temptations. 
As a benchmark, the DU model fails this descriptive 
challenge. As Samuelson [52] noted, the DU model (with 
exponential discounting) implies that resolutions once 
made are never broken. Economists refer to this property 
as dynamic consistency. Anyone who follows the 
exponential discounting model will be dynamically 
consistent – they will never change their state-contingent 
preferences. Plans or preferences made for the future will 
be the same as decisions executed at the moment of action. 
In this framework, resolutions to quit smoking or stick to 
a diet are always carried out (unless new decision-relevant 
information arrives). 
Real people don’t have such exquisite self-command 
[20,53]. Most people experience preference reversals: plans 
made at one date are broken at some later date. For 
instance, estimates of relapse rates exceed 50% during the 
first year after quitting smoking. Many other types of 
behavior illustrate this tendency to backslide, including 
credit card spending, exercise and nutrition [54–56]. 
Beginning with the groundbreaking work of Ainslie [2,20], 
these types of effects have been integrated into models of 
time discounting. 
The exponential discounting model counterfactually 
rules out preference reversals. However, any other 
discounting behavior has the potential to generate 
preference reversals, which economists refer to as dynamic 
inconsistency. This potential was first discussed by 
Samuelson [52] and then developed by others [22,57]. 
Most research has focused on the class of hyperbolic [2,7] 
and quasi-hyperbolic discount functions [13], which 
predict that agents will make patient plans and then 
break them at the moment of execution (Box 1). 
Representation 
Economic analysis assumes that how a choice is 
represented is an objective matter. But, in fact, it is 
possible to mentally represent the same situation in a 
variety of different ways [82]. People use a wide range of 
choice heuristics to make the decisions they face and 
which heuristics come into play depends crucially on how 
they construe these decisions [83,84]. As a result, 
differences in context or in the way that a decision is 
‘framed’ or cognitively construed can have an impact on 
the intertemporal tradeoffs that people make. 
A child’s ability to delay gratification depends on the 
manner in which the child is instructed to mentally 
represent a reward [9,85]. When given a choice between 
an immediate single pretzel or two delayed pretzels, 
children were more likely to wait if instructed to represent 
the pretzel in pallid or unappealing terms – for instance, 
3 as ‘little brown logs’ – than if they were to represent the 
pretzel in consumatory terms – ‘yummy, tasty’. In 
research with adults, Wilson and Daly [
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86] found that 
showing male subjects photographs of attractive females 
raises the male subjects’ monetary discount rates. Wilson 
and Daly’s results show that reproductively salient stimuli 
change the way that individuals evaluate time-dated 
monetary rewards, possibly by creating a general sense of 
urgency or by generating emotional arousal, which 
increases the relative strength of the impatient affective 
reward systems. 
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A variety of studies have shown that framing an 
intertemporal choice in a fashion that draws more 
attention to the need to wait during the delay interval 
tends to produce steeper time discounting – less 
willingness to delay. For example, subjects are much less 
willing to delay gratification when they made a choice that 
was expressed in terms of delay than when the same 
choice was expressed in terms of speed-up or simply as a 
choice between outcomes at two different points in time 
[37]. More recently, several studies have shown that 
people tend to display flatter time discounting when the 
delay interval of an intertemporal choice is presented in 
terms of dates – for example, x today or y on a particular 
date – than when expressed in terms of a delay interval – 
for example, x today or y after a wait of z days (where the 
interval in the two choices is equal) [87]. 
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Given the complexities of many decisions, people often 
simplify the process of decision making by drawing from a 
toolbox of different choice heuristics – simple rules of 
choice that dictate what to do in a particular situation 
[83]. Examples of choice heuristics might include ‘pick 
what the last person picked’ or ‘pick what you picked last 
time (unless it turned out bad)’. If the representation of 
the choice affects the selection of choice heuristics, then 
representation will have an impact on decision making. 
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One important choice heuristic that people seem to 
employ is to choose sequences of outcomes that improv
over time – a pattern of choice that effectively results i
‘negative time preference’: subjects prefer to have th
smaller rewards early and the larger rewards later
contrary to what the DU model would predict. However
whether a particular intertemporal choice is represente
as a sequence, and hence whether this heuristic is applied, 
can depend on relatively subtle factors. In the firs
demonstration of this point, Prelec and Loewenstein [88
asked some subjects to hypothetically choose whether to 
consume a fancy French dinner on the following weeken
or on a weekend one month later. Most subjects chose t
have the French dinner on the earlier date. However
when the decision was represented as a sequence of tw
events on fixed dates, where subjects could choose to eat at 
home on one weekend and eat the fancy dinner on th
other, a majority of subjects now chose to delay the fanc
French dinner to the later date. Later research found tha
the more coherent a sequence was made to seem, the mor
probable subjects were to opt for improving sequences [89
Conclusion 
The research reviewed above identifies three operation
that affect intertemporal choice. Anticipation produce
immediate hedonic consequences, even when the 
anticipated consumption event is delayed in time. Self-
control is used to resist temptations to reverse patient 
plans. Representations evoke specific choice heuristics 
that increase or decrease the salience of delayed rewards 
and make waiting more or less aversive. Any 
comprehensive account of intertemporal choice should 
incorporate all of these mechanisms. At the moment, we 
know little about how these mechanisms interact, which 
should be a priority for future research. At the most 
general level, it is important to determine whether the 
brain has one all-purpose time discounting mechanism or 
whether the brain draws upon different systems, each 
with its own occasionally competing time perspective. 
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Although the new models of intertemporal choice are 
more realistic than the DU model they are intended to 
replace, the increased realism has come at the expense of 
simplicity. Researchers face a familiar conflict between 
parsimony and realism. We hope that the interactions 
among economists, psychologists and neuroscientists will 
identify basic neural mechanisms that explain a wide 
range of empirical regularities. We believe that models 
with multiple interacting/competing neural mechanisms 
represent the most promising research frontier (Box 2). 
Such models are characterized by at least two classes of 
neural systems – patient systems that implement cool, 
analytic preferences and impatient systems that 
implement hot, affective preferences. 
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Box 1. Modeling preference reversals 
Standard economic theory assumes that individuals (agents) have preferences that are stable through time. In this context a preference refers 
to a rank ordering of outcomes, or choices, that an individual makes. For example, a person might be said to prefer tea over coffee. However, 
actions speak louder than words and simply professing such a preference is no guarantee that, given a choice, such an individual would 
actually choose tea. Because of the hidden nature of preferences, eliciting choices (e.g. through forced-choice or willingness-to-pay) is the only 
reliable way to measure preferences. Even so, individuals often exhibit reversals in their apparent preferences when it comes to delayed 
outcomes. Dieting, for example, often falls into this trap of preference reversals. An individual makes a New Year’s resolution to lose weight (a 
temporally remote outcome), but when confronted with the deliciousness of food, changes his mind (a temporally immediate outcome). Such 
preference reversals can be modeled in terms of a non-exponential discount function. Assume that an economic agent has a quasi-hyperbolic 
discount function: 1, β·δ, β·δ
2, β·δ
3, ….. (Figure 1). In general, this discount function is parameterized with 0 < β < 1 and 0 < δ < 1, but to simplify 
the illustrative example, set β = 1/2 and δ = 1, so the discount function takes the form 1, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2, ….,. Immediate payoffs have a weight of 
one and all future payoffs have a weight of 1/2. Assume that an investment activity has an immediate cost of four and a delayed benefit of six. 
When the investment opportunity is distant in time, the agent plans to undertake the investment because 1/2(-4) + 1/2(6) = 1. However, when the 
moment of action arises, the agent changes her mind because 1(-4) + 1/2(6) = -1. 
If agents anticipate such preference reversals [57], they might find ways to commit themselves in advance – for instance, scheduling an 
appointment to exercise with a trainer or putting their saving into illiquid accounts [13]. If agents fail to anticipate their preference reversals, 
they might engage in patently self-defeating behaviors, such as perpetually paying monthly dues at a gym that they never attend [54] or, more 
generally, procrastinating [58,59]. 
The predictions of the basic hyperbolic discounting model have been experimentally and empirically validated [20,60]. But the basic 
hyperbolic discount function provides only a partial account of intertemporal preferences [6]. Most importantly, temporal immediacy of rewards 
is only one of many factors that seem to produce impulsivity. Other factors include sensory proximity – the sight, sound, smell or touch of a 
desired reward – and the activation of drive states, such as hunger, thirst or sexual arousal. Thus, for example, mild opioid deprivation in a 
population of heroin-addicted outpatients produces greater discounting of monetary rewards [61]. Likewise, nicotine deprivation among 
smokers also produces greater monetary discounting [62,63]. People often lose control in the ‘heat of the moment’ or when willpower is 
depleted [64]. 
Although preference reversals are often attributed to hyperbolic time discounting, they can also result from other mechanisms (which 
themselves, in some cases, can help to explain hyperbolic time discounting). Three (overlapping) categories of mechanisms are visceral 
influences, cue-contingent influences and temptation preferences. 
Visceral influences are associated with emotion and affect, and are directly related to changes in drive state. Visceral preferences are 
generated by immediate biological imperatives – for instance, thirst, hunger, sexual arousal, exhaustion, pain, the need to physically dominate 
an opponent, or fear for physical safety. Loewenstein has argued that visceral needs often overwhelm other goals and produce short-sighted 
behavior [65]. This assumption has also been adopted in a two-state decision-making model [66]. In the cold state, the decision-maker is guided 
by forward-looking rational deliberations. In the hot state, the decision-maker is completely controlled by her myopic visceral needs. Hence, 
highly impatient behavior would be associated with time periods in which the visceral preferences are dominant, explaining many addictive 
behaviors, including excess use of an addictive substance and relapse after detoxification. 
Cue-contingent preferences have been studied since Pavlov’s feeding experiments [67]. Cue-contingent preferences are formed when a 
neutral stimulus is repeatedly paired with a non-neutral stimulus, such as a consumption event. The end result is a change in drive state, even 
though the eliciting stimulus was, at one point, neutral. For instance, a heroin user might come to associate the visual stimuli of a certain 
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environment with ingestion of heroin. Such pairings might be strong enough to elicit cue-contingent drug cravings and cue-contingent 
tolerance, so that the user’s desire to take heroin becomes much stronger when the cues are present [68]. Cue-contingent cravings might 
produce preference reversals, transitory efforts to achieve immediate gratification, and forward-looking efforts to modify cue exposure 
[65,66,69]. Indeed, several brain-imaging experiments have demonstrated the powerful effect of showing pictures of drug-related paraphernalia 
to people who are addicted to these substances [70–75]. Although craving, in and of itself, does not represent a breakdown in self-control, it 
does represent an emotional state that places the individual at risk for a preference reversal. The biological substrates of craving, however, are 
complex and recruit a wide range of circuits in the brain that include memory regions such as the hippocampus, executive control regions in 
the prefrontal cortex, and visceral regions such as the insula. However, no single brain region has been demonstrated to be singularly 
responsible for self-control. Instead, multiple systems process different psychological dimensions of competing preferences. 
Temptation preferences arise in two-system models and are another way of describing the temporal immediacy effect of rewards by 
invoking the cost of self-control [66,76–78]. Rather than postulating a non-exponential discount function, temptation preferences are typically 
modeled as a drive for immediate gratification, which can be cognitively overridden with some utility cost generated by mental effort (self-
control). In the models cited here, the cost is associated with the degree to which the impatient preference is violated. The end result, however, 
is the same as a non-exponential discount function. For example, imagine that an agent has a craving to eat a (full) bowl of ice cream sitting in 
front of him, but allows himself to eat only some fraction of that bowl. Temptation models assume that the cost of temptation is falling in the 
amount that the agent eats. If the agent eats nothing, then temptation costs are maximal. If the agent eats the whole bowl, then temptation 
costs are zero. Temptation preferences are one way of formally modeling the interaction between the patient (cortical) system and the 
impatient (mesolimbic dopamine reward related) system. Little is known about the nature of the interaction of these two putative systems, but 
one brain region, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), is thought to have a role in mediating the conflict between competing actions [79,80]. The 
exertion of self-control requires the suppression of either cravings or temptations, which are the types of competing responses that the ACC 
modulates. Another region, the inferior prefrontal cortex, seems to be involved in achieving self-control by inhibiting one of these responses 
[81]. Importantly, how the ACC processes these conflicts and how the inferior prefrontal cortex inhibits one or another depends on the context 
in which these temptations occur, which leads to the third aspect of intertemporal choice: representation. 
 
Box 2. Directions for future research 
How can neurobiological data be used to develop and test models of intertemporal choice? In the past, the tautology of choice and preference 
has excluded analysis of neurobiological mechanisms. In recent years, a growing body of data based on brain imaging is enabling researchers 
to link intertemporal decisions to neural activation patterns, producing both new empirical regularities and new controversies [14,90,91]. The 
challenge will be to marry neurobiological descriptions with theoretical ones. 
Can a single model account for the large range of timescales over which intertemporal choices are made? Such choices range from intervals of 
milliseconds to decades. Is there a unifying framework for all such intertemporal choices or do different mechanisms apply at different 
timescales? 
How does the representation of time itself influence intertemporal choice? The representation of time is typically assessed in a retrospective 
manner (i.e. how much time has passed). Intertemporal choices are fundamentally prospective. How does the representation of the past affect 
the representation of the future? 
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Figure 1. Discount functions. Exponential discounting assumes a constant rate of discounting, e.g. δ
t where δ is the discount rate (here, δ =  0.95). Hyperbolic 
discounting is generally greater for short time periods than long periods, and can be described by a function of the form 1 / (K * t + 1). Here, K = 0.1. Quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting is a piecewise function that follows a form similar to exponential discounting after the first discount period (i.e. the first year): 1, β·δ, β·δ
2, …, β·δ
t. Here, β = 
0.792 and δ = 0.96).  
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